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ABSTRACT 
 
For many years, the South African doctrine of duress has fell short of recognising 
threats of economic harm as an actionable defence in the law of contract. As we have 
now entered a commercial era, where a person’s economic prosperity and profitability 
are paramount, various legal systems such as America and England have recognised 
the inherent illegitimacy of these novel threats.  
The contextual approach adopted in these jurisdictions could provide essential 
guidelines for South African courts in developing a modern test for duress. By 
evaluating the context in which parties reach consensus, characteristics such as 
gender could potentially become an important factor in the courts’ evaluation. From a 
South African perspective, women have been historically and statistically economically 
vulnerable due to the gendered nature of contract law and their inequality in society.  
A feminist perspective on economic duress asks the question of whether a court would, 
in future, be more inclined to accept a claim of economic duress if the action is 
instituted by a woman. In addition, this perspective will also evaluate whether this 
approach would have commercial ramifications for women and reaffirm the notion that 
women are weaker contractants in need of special protection.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Economic duress  
“But when the use of superior force is barred, man, a resourceful animal, turns 
to economic weapons; and these have increased in effectiveness, as in 
frequency of use, more speedily than our readiness to cope with them.”1 
Consensus is considered to be the crux of contract law and has recently become a point of 
contention within the academic realm. The question of what encompasses “true consensus” is 
problematic in many jurisdictions.2 When a party enters into a contract on the basis of a 
misrepresentation, or through undue influence or duress, the contract in question is, to some 
extent, tainted by improperly obtained consensus.3 In this regard, consensus is not lacking, as 
the parties are cognizant of the material terms upon which the contract is based.4 As a result, 
the consensus obtained through weapons of, for example, duress, is flawed and is not 
considered to be true consensus.5 
Traditional notions of duress are centred around “a threat toward the person or property of a 
contractual party, or his or her immediate family”.6 Economic duress is one such form of the 
doctrine of duress that has emerged in recent years. Economic duress is based on the 
traditional view of duress, however, it involves a threat directed at the economic interests of a 
person.7 Where the formation of a contract involves economic threats, the consensus that is 
secured, is superficial in that it has been obtained merely as a means of avoiding a more 
burdensome evil, and is therefore, not a reflection of their true intention and free will.8 
The supreme court of appeal, for the first time, gave an extensive analysis on the notion of 
economic duress in Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee.9 In casu, the supreme court of 
appeal had to determine whether an “unlawful or unconscionable threat” of economic harm 
 
1 Dalzell “Duress by economic pressure” 1942 North Carolina Law Review 237 238.  
2 Gan “Contractual duress and relations of power” 2013 Harvard Law Review 171 174.  
3 Hutchison et al The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 114.  
4 n 3 above.   
5 n 3 above.   
6 Pretorius and Ismail “Compromise, undue influence and economic duress Gerolomou Constructions 
(Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 2011 4 SA 500 (GNP)” 2012 Obiter 681 689. 
7 Pretorius and Ismail (n 6) 689 and 690. 
8 Dalzell (n 1) 239.  
9 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee 2005 5 SA 339 (SCA). 
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could potentially align with the doctrine of duress in South African law.10 Prior to this judgment, 
the approach to economic duress was encompassed in various judgments, which generally 
upheld the notion that threats to economic interests are not actionable in South African law of 
contract.11 
The supreme court of appeal, in Medscheme Holdings held that although the contractual 
defence of economic duress has not been accepted in South African law, no reason exists why 
it should not be recognised in appropriate circumstances.12 
This judgment aligns with the contemporary approach that has been adopted in jurisdictions 
such as the USA and England. These legal systems have emphasised the utility and 
importance of such a remedy in a modern world where commercial pressure is, in certain 
instances, deemed as unconscionable as traditional notions of duress.13 
1.2. A feminist perspective on economic duress  
Economic duress as well as feminist ideals are considered to conflict with foundational 
contractual values such as freedom of contract and consensus.14 These contractual principles 
are considered by feminist scholars, as mechanisms that have further facilitated the historical 
oppression of women that provide limited opportunities for womankind who have, and still 
continue to be trapped in a patriarchal society.15 
Past experience depicts contract law as a “men only club” that has discriminated and excluded 
women from this legal arena.16 Although women’s rights have made important strides in the 
right direction, the question of whether modern contract law continues to discriminate against 
women is undoubtedly valid.17 On the one hand, some feminists argue  that women are unable 
to enjoy their contractual rights on an equal footing to their male counterparts.18 The doctrine 
of duress, specifically economic duress, could potentially develop into a mechanism capable 
 
10 Cassim “Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee: The concept of economic duress” 2005 SALJ 
528 529 and Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd & Another v Bhamjee (n 9) par 6.  
11 Glover “Developing a test for economic duress in the South African law of contract: A comparative 
perspective” 2006 SALJ 285 286.  
12 Medscheme Holding (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 7.  
13 Cassim (n 10) 529.  
14 Hadfield “The dilemma of choice: A feminist perspective on the limits of freedom of contract” 1995 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 337 338.  
15 Hadfield (n 14) 339.  
16 Gan “Anti-stereotyping and contract law” 2019 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 83 101.  
17 Gan (n 16) 84.  
18 Wiegers “Economic analysis of law and private ordering” 1992 University of Toronto Law Journal 
171 205. 
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of addressing the issue of unlawful or unconscionable contracts that arise due to the economic 
disparity and vulnerability of South African women.19 
However, feminists have recently begun questioning whether paternalistic doctrines such as 
duress will ultimately help or hinder women in the contractual realm.20 It is argued that these 
doctrines have historically been developed to protect weaker parties and thus, associating the 
utility of such a defence with women would ultimately depict women as weak, vulnerable and 
in need of extra protection, which could lead to a disinterest in contracting with women 
entirely.21 This would undoubtedly have adverse effects for women’s economic activity.  
Therefore, both sides of this feminist perspective will have to be critically considered in order 
to determine whether economic duress would offer protection to women contracting in South 
Africa, or if it would worsen women’s position in the law of contract and the market economy 
as a whole. 
1.3. Problem Statement  
The judgment in Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee has led to the question of whether 
economic duress should be accepted as an actionable form of duress in South African law. 
The first issue at hand is whether there is an actual need for such a defence in our law.  
As a point of departure, this study will analyse the judgment of Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
v Bhamjee and consider the influence of this judgment on the law of contract. In particular, the 
need for an actionable form of economic duress in our law will be considered in light of this 
judgment. In addition, earlier judgments that considered the applicability of economic duress 
will be analysed to determine whether our common law of contract should be developed.  
However, in order for such a defence to be accepted into our law, an appropriate test for 
economic duress will have to be developed by the courts. It will have to be determined whether 
the test for traditional duress is applicable to situations involving threats of an economic nature. 
In this regard, suggestions from foreign law, including both American and English law, will be 
considered.  
With regards to the feminist debate on the issue of economic duress, the economic standing 
of women in South Africa will be considered through statistical data. Statistics show that 
women are generally in an inferior economic position compared to their male counterparts, due 
 
19 Threedy “Feminists and contract doctrine” 1999 Indiana Law Review 1247 1248.  
20 Threedy (n 19) 1263.  
21 Threedy (n 19) 1248.    
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to inherent gender disparities, such as the average monthly income of female-headed 
households and the literacy and education rates amongst women.22 These factors undoubtedly 
place women in a vulnerable position when contracting, thus becoming more susceptible to 
economic threats of more powerful parties. 
This study will therefore have to evaluate whether the doctrine of economic duress could 
alleviate the issues associated with this feminist dilemma and whether it would provide 
vulnerable contracting parties, such as women, with a powerful tool that will enable them to 
circumvent the harsh consequences of contracts concluded as a result of economic threats. 
While economic duress could prove to be a useful remedy for South African women, some 
authors argue that these mechanisms will have adverse consequences and would confirm the 
inherent patriarchal nature of contract law that depicts women as weak and in need of 
protection.23 In this regard, conflicting feminist perspectives will be considered and balanced 
against one another.  
1.4. Research methodology 
The method adopted in this study is based on a doctrinal analysis of relevant literature, which 
involves asking what the law is in a particular area.24 Doctrinal analysis involves collecting and 
analysing case law, legislation and various secondary sources such as books and journal 
articles.  
In addition, this study includes a comparative analysis of American and English law. 
Traditionally, the study of law has been nationally orientated. Through comparative analysis, 
researches critically analyse their own legal systems while formulating suggestions for future 
development and detecting potential difficulties that may arise.25 
The reason these jurisdictions have been selected is because both these jurisdictions have 
been instrumental in developing the doctrine of economic duress and were among the first 
countries to recognise this contractual defence.26 In addition, English law, which will be the 
main point of comparison in this study, was selected due to the English law influence in South 
African law.  
 
22 Statistics South Africa “Social profile for vulnerable groups in South Africa” 2013 
(http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-19-00/Report-03-19-002012.pdf (12-07-2019)).  
23 Threedy (n 19) 1248.   
24 McConville and Hong Chui Research Methods for Law (2007) 19.    
25 McConville and Hong Chui (n 24) 87.  
26 Glover (n 11) 286 and 287.  
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Lastly, socio-legal research methodology, specifically feminist legal studies, is employed in this 
study.  The reason for adopting this methodology lies in the rigidity and inflexibility of a purely 
doctrinal analysis.27 The benefit of adopting such an approach to answer legal questions, is 
that the broader social and political context is considered, which produces valuable results that 
depicts the law as a social phenomenon.28  
Through this methodology, the issue of economic duress is seen through the lens of South 
Africa women. This analysis offers a fresh perspective on the issue of economic duress and 
ultimately examines the relationship between law, gender and other social relations of power.29 
1.5. Research objective and research question 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether economic duress should be 
recognised as a legitimate form of improperly obtained consensus in South African law of 
contract from the perspective of South African women. This objective asks whether a feminist 
perspective on economic duress would, in future, be considered and upheld by a court?  
1.6. Proposed chapter outline 
Chapter one introduces the study and provides a detailed overview, the research question, 
problem statement as well as the research methodologies that have been adopted in this study.  
Chapter two discusses improperly obtained consensus in South African law of contract and 
examines the traditional doctrine of duress in our law. In addition, the chapter discusses the 
test for duress formulated by Wessels.   
Chapter three sets out an analysis of economic duress in South African law of contract through 
a discussion of case law and academic opinions.  
Chapter four encompasses a comparative analysis of the law of the USA as well as English 
Law. Furthermore, this chapter discusses how these legal systems could facilitate a modern 
approach to duress and examines how it could facilitate the development of economic duress 
in South African law.   
Chapter five raises a feminist argument on the issue of economic duress. This chapter 
analyses the utility of an actionable form of economic duress from the viewpoint of women in 
South Africa.  
 
27 McConville and Hong Chui (n 24) 4. 
28 McConville and Hong Chui (n 24) 5.  
29 McConville and Hong Chui (n 24) 6. 
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Chapter six summarises the discussions in the previous chapters and concludes the study at 
hand so as to formulate recommendations on the issue of economic duress. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION ON DURESS 
 
2.1. Improperly obtained consensus  
Modern Roman-Dutch law of contract defines a contract as “an agreement (arising from either 
true or quasi-mutual assent) which is, or is intended to be enforceable at law”.30 Consensus is 
considered to be the cornerstone of contract law and has become the topic of much scholarly 
debate.31 The question of what constitutes “true consensus” lies at the heart of this debate 
throughout many jurisdictions.32  
The courts’ general approach to consensus is discussed n Pieters & Co v Salomon,33 where 
Innes J emphasised the objective essence of our law of contract and held that:34 
“when a man makes an offer in plain and unambiguous language, which is understood in 
its ordinary sense by the person to whom it is addressed, and accepted by him bona fide 
in that sense, then there is a concluded contract. Any unexpressed reservations hidden 
in the mind of the promisor are in such circumstances irrelevant.” 
Thus, it appears that objectivity is considered to be the crux of contract law and without it, 
many academics argue that conducting business would place contractants in a vulnerable and 
insecure position.35 As our law does not require true subjective consensus, the sanctity of 
contract has historically been preferred, which in certain instances,  overlooks the inherent 
unfairness of a contract.36 As a result, our law has developed several principles and defences 
to avoid and remedy the enforceability of unfair contracts. Contractual defences such as undue 
influence and duress have become invaluable mechanisms in our law of contract that are 
capable of addressing the issue of improperly obtained consensus. 
Improperly obtained consensus refers to the situation where a person enters into a contract 
under the strength of an element of force, threat, or fear.37 In these instances, as opposed to 
cases of material mistake for example, there is no lack of consensus as the parties are 
cognizant of the material terms of the agreement.38 However, as the consensus was obtained 
 
30 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (2006) 2.  
31 Gan (n 2) 171.  
32 n 31 above.   
33 Pieters & Co v Salomon 1911 (AD).  
34 Pieters & Co v Salomon (n 33) par 137.  
35 Christie (n 30) 12.  
36 n 35 above.  
37 Van Huyssteen, Van der Merwe and Maxwell Contract Law in South Africa (2010) 121. 
38 n 3 above.   
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through improper means, it is inherently flawed to a certain extent, and as such the law renders 
these contracts voidable at the instance of the concerned party.39 Misrepresentation, undue 
influence and duress are examples of contractual defences that aim to remedy improperly 
obtained consensus either through restitution or delictual damages.40 
The doctrine of duress, in particular, has become a contentious issue in our law as it is widely 
considered to be as a last-ditch effort of a desperate plaintiff.41  It has been suggested that the 
courts’ over-reliance on other contractual defences such as the doctrine of undue influence 
has allowed duress to become an underdeveloped and overlooked principle in our law.42 
However, many academics argue that a modern conception of the doctrine of duress would be 
an ideal mechanism, capable of addressing issues that are commonplace in a commercialised 
era.43 
2.2. The doctrine of duress in South African contract law 
Duress is defined as “improper pressure that amounts to intimidation”,44 and which ultimately 
constitutes a defective and unenforceable agreement.45 South African case law illustrates the 
inefficacious nature of duress and indicates that this defence is often perceived as unpromising 
and “the last resort of a desperate litigant”.46 Consensus given under any form of duress is 
considered to be ‘unreal’ because, had it not been for a certain unfavourable alternative, it 
would not have been given.47 The consensus is superficial, not because it was not freely given, 
but in the hope of avoiding a “more serious evil”.48  
Almost all contracts contain, to some extent, are impelled by duress, as our free will constitutes 
a choice between limited alternatives. Dalzell exemplifies this notion where he explains that 
when a person agrees to pay for a loaf of bread, he does so not because he wants to pay 
money to the baker, but because without the bread he will starve.49 This example exemplifies 
that freedom of contract is often limited to opting for the lesser of two evils, however, a defence 
of duress succeeds only where the threat or pressure exerted on a person is unconscionable 
or unfair.50  
 
39 n 3 above.  
40 Hutchison et al (n 3) 115.  
41 Glover “The test for economic duress in South Africa law of contract” 2006 SALJ 98 99.  
42 Pretorius and Ismail (n 6) 691.  
43 Cassim (n 10) 540.  
44 Hutchinson et al (n 3) 136.  
45 Gan (n 2) 176.  
46 n 41 above. 
47 n 1 above.   
48 Dalzell (n 1) 239.  
49 n 48 above.   
50 n 48 above and Cassim (n 10) 533. 
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The ineffectiveness of this doctrine appears to arise due to the absence of a commercial 
approach and the over reliance on archaic tests set out by our courts. The authoritative test 
for duress was developed in the case of Broodryk v Smuts,51 which is considered to be the 
locus classicus on this doctrine. 
Wessels summarised the elements for consensus that was laid down in Broodryk v Smuts as 
follows:52  
(i) actual violence or reasonable fear;  
(ii) the fear must be caused by the threat of some considerable evil to the party or his 
family”;  
(iii) it must be a threat of imminent or inevitable evil;  
(iv) the threat or intimidation must be contra bones mores; and  
(v) the moral pressure used must have caused damage.  
 
2.2.1. Actual violence or reasonable fear  
Actual violence refers to the situation where a person a person physically forces the hand of 
another party and is what was referred to as vis absoluta by Voet at common law.53  In cases 
of physical force, consensus is vitiated as “the signature is a written result of brute force” and 
therefore, the law does not recognise the legality of such an agreement.54 Traditionally, duress 
was applicable in these cases involving physical harm caused to a person which has the effect 
of coercing him into concluding a voidable contract.55  
However, in modern times, the doctrine of duress is centred around the incitement of fear 
within the prejudiced party.56 The underlying threat has become the trademark of an enquiry 
of duress and is defined as an unsolicited proposal made either expressly, implicitly or tacitly, 
that induces a contractant to act to their detriment, by either entering into a contract or altering 
a pre-existing contract.57 In order to establish whether the threat or fear amounts to duress, it 
must be determined whether the reasonable person, in the position of the prejudiced party, 
would be unable to overcome the fear incited upon him.58  
 
51 Broodryk v Smuts NO 1942 (TPD) par 47.  
52 Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa (1937) 1167.  
53 Christie (n 30) 301. 
54 Glover (n 41) 100.  
55 n 54 above.   
56 n 54 above.  
57 Glover (n 11) 288.  
58  Christie (n 30) 302.  
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In Steiger v Union Government,59 the court indicated that fear will invalidate an agreement 
“when the fear is not vain or foolish. But such as to overcome a man of ordinary firmness”.60 
South African courts have opted for the Roman-Dutch approach to evaluating the 
reasonableness of fear which asks whether a reasonable person, in the position of and who 
possesses similar characteristics of the prejudiced party, would reasonably have experienced 
fear and whether the reasonable person would have been able to overcome the fear incited.61  
2.2.2. Threat of some considerable evil to the party or his family 
The requirements laid down by Wessels indicate that the threat must be of some considerable 
evil that has the potential to coerce an individual’s will.62  Where a threat is merely inconvenient 
or annoying and has minor implications for an individual, duress is absent.63 As the use of the 
world ‘evil’ is an archaic conception of this requirement, Glover indicates that this requirement, 
is similar to the fourth requirement in that the threat should be contra bones mores.64  
The second element of this requirement indicates that the threat must be directed at the “life, 
bodily integrity or property of the person concerned or his or her immediate family”.65 Although 
a case involving threats directed towards a person outside one’s immediate family has not 
been brought before our courts, Christie suggests a court would extend this requirement to 
include friends and distant relatives in appropriate circumstances.66 With regards to threats 
directed at property interests, or duress of goods, the courts have expressed that the party 
concerned must have expressed “unequivocal objection to the payment” at the time it was 
made so as to establish the involuntariness of the conduct.67  
However, the court in Hendricks v Barnett,68 disagreed with previous judgments and held that 
silence is not indicative of voluntariness and that even where the party concerned did not 
express an objection, relief should be granted if the circumstances are indicative of duress.69 
Thus, an analysis of this requirement indicates that at present, South African law recognises 
duress of the person, bodily integrity as well as duress of goods.  
 
59 Steiger v Union Government 1919 40 (NLR).  
60 Steiger v Union Government (n 59) par 79.  
61 n 54 above.  
62 Glover (n 41) 103.  
63 n 62 above and Freeman v Corporation of Maritzburg 1882 (NLR) 117 par 123.  
64 Glover (n 41) 103 and 104.   
65 Hutchison et al (n 3) 138.  
66 Christie (n 30) 303.  
67 White Brothers v Treasurer-General 1883 2 SC 322 par 351 and 352.  
68 Hendricks v Barnett 1975 1 SA 765 (N) par 769.  
69 Hutchison et al (n 3) 139.  
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The criticism of the narrowness of duress are centred around this requirement which has 
excluded threats of economic harm from the ambit of duress. Academics have begun 
questioning whether it is time for our law to develop the law of contract and to include economic 
duress as an actionable form of duress.70  
2.2.3. A threat of imminent or inevitable evil 
Furthermore, the prejudiced party who alleges duress will have to establish that the threat was 
of an imminent or inevitable evil.  This requirement provides that the consequences of resisting 
the threat must be immediate and unavoidable and as such, the only protection available to 
the concerned party is to consensus to the agreement.71 This suggests that in appropriate 
circumstances, the contractant should consider legal mechanisms available to him before 
succumbing to the threat.72  
The judgment In BOE Bank Bpk v Van Zyl confirms this idea.73 In casu, the bank in question 
warned the plaintiff that if he did not sign a surety agreement, they would institute criminal 
proceedings against his son-in-law on the basis of fraud or theft.74 The court found that as the 
plaintiff had ample time to consider the legal position before signing the suretyship agreement, 
the threat was not imminent and he therefore, did not act under duress.75  
However, academics have disagreed with this notion, and it has been suggested that where 
the party did not have any reasonable alternatives available to him, the imminence or 
inevitability of the threat is irrelevant.76 
2.2.4. The threat or intimidation must be unlawful or contra bones mores 
The fourth element for an enquiry of duress provides that the threat or intimidation must have 
been unlawful or contra bones mores. The general aim of this requirement is to ensure that a 
person who threatens to exercise a legal right should not be culpable in the eyes of the law, 
and therefore, a party who succumbs to such a threat is without legal remedy.77 Traditionally 
this requirement was viewed restrictively by our courts which provided that “it is only where 
fear is caused illegally that restitution is competent”.78  
 
70 Pretorius and Ismail (n 6) 692. 
71 Glover (n 41) 104.  
72 Hutchison et al (n 3) 139 and 140.  
73 BOE Bank Bpk v Van Zyl 2002 5 SA 165 (C).  
74 Christie (n 30) 306.  
75 n 74 above and BOE Bank v Van Zyl (n 73) par 56.  
76 n 72 above.  
77 n 74 above. 
78 Salter v Haskins 1914 (TPD) par 264.  
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The restrictive approach adopted by this court suggests that a defence of duress would only 
succeed where threats are criminal or delictual in nature and therefore, it excludes threats that 
aim to secure an “immoral or improper goal or purpose”.79 Academics support the view that 
threats are unreasonable where they are made with the hopes of achieving an illegitimate or 
immoral purpose.80 This approach emphasises the need to consider the nature and object of 
the threat in order to consider whether an agreement is influenced by duress.81  
Academics have argued that the law needs to align itself with commercial realities in that 
duress that is nevertheless lawful might still be contra bones mores as a person’s commercial 
interests and financial stability are considered to be as important as their bodily integrity or 
property interests.82  
2.2.5. The moral pressure used must have caused damage 
The final requirement of duress is similar to the requirements of a delictual claim in that, unless 
the concerned party has suffered harm, no action is available to the party.83 Without proving 
patrimonial loss, the concerned party will not be able to utilise the Aquilian action for damages 
or restitution.84 According to the approach laid down in Broodryk v Smuts,85 the party that raises 
the defence of duress bears the onus of proving that had he not been coerced into an 
agreement, he would not be subject to specific obligations.86  
Glover argues that this requirement is unnecessary and that concluding a contract under the 
guise of duress sufficiently establishes damage in this regard.87  
2.3. Criticism of the traditional test for duress 
The Romanist approach adopted by the court in Broodryk v Smuts remains the authoritative 
test for duress in South Africa. The major criticism of the traditional test for duress focuses 
firstly, on the narrowness of duress in that it does not recognise the unconscionability of 
economic threats that are commonplace in a modern commercialised world.88  
Secondly, critics of this traditional doctrine argue that Wessel’s formulation of duress is overly 
reliant on objectivity in assessing the reasonableness of fear. In this regard, an abstract 
 
79 Glover (n 41) 105 and 106.  
80 n 72 above.  
81 n 79 above.   
82 Glover (n 11) 286 and 294. 
83 Christie (n 30) 308.  
84 n 72 above.   
85 Broodryk v Smuts (n 51) par 51 and 52.  
86 n 72 above.   
87 Glover (n 41) 107.  
88 Glover (n 11) 287.   
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approach ignores the circumstances present in the mind of the innocent party and furthermore, 
does not acknowledge that certain people tend to respond differently to fear.89  
Therefore, calls for a broad and contextual approach to duress has intensified amongst 
academics who suggest that our courts should bring our law of contract in line with Anglo-
American legal systems who have acknowledged a contemporary doctrine of duress.90 
In what is seen as the first step in developing our doctrine of duress, the judgment in 
Medscheme Holdings v Bhamjee suggests that economic duress could in future, be 
recognised as a legitimate form of improperly obtained consensus in South African law. The 
next chapter considers the South African courts’ view on duress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 Gan (n 2) 217.    
90 Glover (n 11) 287.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS’ VIEW ON ECONOMIC DURESS 
 
3.1. The nature of economic duress 
Wessel’s formulation of the requirements for duress indicates that South African courts have 
historically confined the application of duress to threats directed to a person or his property, or 
to threats of criminal prosecution.91 At first glance, it appears that the South African doctrine of 
duress falls short of recognising economic duress as an actionable claim in our law..92  
Economic duress or business compulsion is defined as the “imposition, oppression or taking 
undue advantage of the business or financial stress or extreme necessity or weakness of 
another”.93 As we live in a complex and thriving commercial era, where a person’s economic 
interests are sometimes considered more valuable than their bodily integrity or property, it is 
undeniable that economic duress can be as coercive and detrimental than traditional notions 
of duress.94 
Lord Devlin encapsulated the essence of economic duress in Rookes v Barnard,95 where he 
held that “all that matters to the plaintiff is that, metaphorically speaking, a club has been used. 
It does not matter to the plaintiff what the club is made of – whether it is a physical club or an 
otherwise illegal club.”96 The need for a sophisticated doctrine of economic duress lies in the 
inherent nature of modern commerce. As we now live in a society that is fixated on financial 
matters and profitability, threats that aim to affect a person’s economic or business interests 
are undoubtedly more menacing than threats directed at one’s physical wellbeing.97 
The law of contract forms the foundation of the modern commercial world and it has become 
intertwined in every aspect of economic activity.98 As we live in a commercialised society, our 
law of contract must be developed to protect economic interests and address mainstream 
issues of an ever-growing commercial era. While, the doctrine of economic duress would 
undoubtedly become a useful mechanism for contractants, the major point of contention is 
 
91 n 90 above.   
92 n 11 above.  
93 Cassim (n 10) 528.  
94 Glover (n 11) 286  
95 Rookes v Barnard 1964 AC 1129 ALL ER 367 (UKHL).  
96 Rookes v Barnard (n 95) par 1209.  
97 Glover (n 11) 286 and 294.  
98 Christie (n 30) 1.  
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rooted in the difficulty of distinguishing between what has been referred to as a “hard bargain” 
and economic duress.99  
This chapter will discuss the importance of extending the doctrine of duress from a South 
African perspective, and how the acceptable scope of hard bargaining should be restricted.100  
3.2. The South African courts’ view on economic duress   
In a landmark judgment, the supreme court of appeal in Medscheme Holdings v Bhamjee, 101 
took the first step in recognising economic duress as an actionable form of duress in South 
African law of contract. Prior to this judgment, the courts had consistently adopted a restrictive 
view on economic duress which has resulted in our law being incapable of appropriately 
addressing issues that are commonplace in a commercial world.102 This judgment as well as 
previous judgments will be analysed which will depict the archaic and restrictive approach of 
our courts. In addition, this chapter will explore the idea that our courts have become overly 
reliant on the doctrine of undue influence in circumstances that fit more appropriately with 
economic duress.  
The issue of economic duress was brought before the High Court for this first time in Van den 
Berg & Kie Rekenkundige Beamptes v Boomprops 1028 BK.103 In casu, Van den Heever AJ 
held that economic duress had not yet formed part of our law and furthermore, declined to 
consider the prospect that our law of contract could, in future, develop in this direction.104 While 
there are other examples of cases that considered the applicability of economic duress, the 
courts’ decisions were based on English admiralty law and are therefore, did not successfully 
develop our South African law of contract.105  
The judgment of the supreme court of appeal in Medscheme Holdings v Bhamjee will likely 
become the catalyst for the development and acknowledgement of economic duress as an 
actionable form of duress in South Africa. 
 
 
 
99 Cassim (n 10) 539.  
100 n 43 above. 
101 n 9 above.   
102 n 94 above.   
103 Van den Berg & Kie Rekenkundige Beamptes v Boomprops 1021 BK 1999 1 SA 780 (T).  
104 Van den Berg & Kie Rekenkundige Beamptes v Boomprops 1028 BK (n 102) par 7921-7293A.   
105 Cassim (n 10) 529; Malilang v MV Houda Pearl 1986 2 SA 714 (A); NEHAWU v Public Health & 
Welfare Sectoral Bargaining Council 2002 3 BLLR 222 (LC).  
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3.2.1. An analysis of Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee  
In casu, Bhamjee, a medical doctor had many patients who were employed by Sasol and 
benefitted from their medical schemes, one of which was the appellant, Medscheme Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd.106 Over the period of two years, Dr Bhamjee signed two acknowledgement of debts 
to the appellant for amounts outstanding that he had claimed. The second acknowledgment of 
debt was for the amount R588 000, and the parties agreed that this debt would be set off 
against the unpaid claims Dr Bhamjee had submitted and that Medscheme had yet to pay.107  
Dr Bhamjee claimed that at the time of signing the acknowledgement of debts, Medscheme 
threatened that if he did not sign, they would terminate direct payment of claims to Dr Bhamjee. 
As a majority of his patients were financially distressed, his patients would be unable to consult 
with him due to lack of funds.108 Dr Bhamjee therefore alleged that, in order to avoid economic 
harm, he agreed to sign the acknowledgement of debts, but that he did so under duress. 
However, before Medscheme approved the terms of this agreement, they decided that they 
would no longer accept claims issued directly by Dr Bhamjee and that he would have to recover 
his fees from the patients directly, and the patients would then be reimbursed by the 
schemes.109   
This had a devastating impact on Dr Bhamjee’s practice, which he eventually closed. This 
provoked Dr Bhamjee to dispute the validity of the agreements on the basis of duress. The 
respondent alleged that due to the relationship between him and the schemes, he was coerced 
into signing the agreements through threats of economic harm.110 Dr Bhamjee brought 
instituted legal proceedings in the Pretoria high court where the court found that Medscheme’s 
threats to cause Dr Bhamjee economic harm were unconscionable and thus, constituted 
economic duress.111 The appellants appealed this decision in the supreme court of appeal.  
The main point of contention that arose in casu was whether the conduct of the appellant 
constituted duress. As Dr Bhamjee alleged he had suffered economic threats and harm, the 
SCA had to consider whether economic coercion constitutes duress in our law.112 Nugent JA 
held that although the principle of economic duress is not yet a part of our law, both American 
and English law accept that economic pressure may amount to duress, which renders a 
contract voidable.113 The SCA further expressed that although these cases are likely to be 
 
106 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 1.  
107 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 3.  
108 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 7 and 9  
109 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 4.  
110 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 6.  
111 Cassim (n 10) 531.  
112 n 93 above.   
113 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 18.  
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infrequent, there is no legitimate basis in South African law for excluding threats of an 
economic nature from our doctrine of duress.114   
Although the SCA’s acknowledgement of economic duress is a step in the right direction, the 
court provided a restrictive distinction between hard bargaining and economic duress. In this 
regard, the SCA confirmed the view of Van den Heever AJ in Van den Berg & Kie,115 that “hard 
bargaining is not the equivalent of duress, and that is so even where the bargain is the product 
of an imbalance in bargaining power”.116 Moreover, Nugent cautioned that:117 
“it is not unlawful, in general, to cause economic harm, or even to cause economic ruin, to 
another, nor can it generally be unconscionable to do so in a competitive economy. In 
commercial bargaining the exercise of free will (if that can ever exist in any pure form of the 
term) is always fettered to some degree by the expectation of gain or the fear of loss.” 
Although the SCA did not expressly endorse the requirements of duress formulated by 
Wessels, the crux of the courts’ enquiry into the claim of duress was based on whether 
Medscheme’s threats were contra bones mores.118 The issue of an imbalance of 
bargaining power in the present case referred to the discretion medical aid schemes 
possessed in whether they will accept direct claims from medical practitioners. This 
discretion undoubtedly affords medical aid schemes, such as Medscheme with superior 
bargaining power in their relationship with medical practitioners who are financially 
dependant on the payment of claims.119  
However, the SCA held that Medscheme’s conduct did not amount to a hard bargain as, 
they were permitted to motivate their members to only consult with doctors whose fees 
were reasonably affordable.120 Thus the court viewed the scheme’s threats as a means of 
ensuring Dr Bhamjee’s fees were market related so that their relationship was 
sustainable.121 The SCA further expressed that Dr Bhamjee was not entitled to insist on a 
continuing relationship with Medscheme on other terms, and furthermore, that he signed 
the agreements as they were conducive in maintaining a lucrative practice.122  
 
114 n 113 above.  
115 Van den Berg & Kie (n 103) par 795E – 796A  
116 n 113 above.   
117 n 113 above. 
118 n 111 above.   
119 Cassim (n 10) 532 and Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 7. 
120 Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee (n 9) par 19.  
121 n 120 above.  
122 n 120 above.   
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The court stated that in order for economic duress to be acknowledged as an actionable 
contractual defence, the economic bargaining in question must be illegitimate or 
unconscionable.123 The SCA found that Medscheme acted within its rights and that although 
Dr Bhamjee would have preferred to not have signed the agreements, he did so not because 
of Medscheme’s economic threats but because it was economically beneficial for him.124 
Therefore, Nugent JA held that Medscheme’s conduct was not contra bones mores, as it was 
neither illegitimate or unconscionable, and thus the defence of economic duress was 
unsuccessful.125  
Prior to the Medscheme case, the courts denied the possibility of economic duress ever 
forming part of our law, however, the SCA changed this view and held that in appropriate 
circumstances, a court would recognise this defence.126 Despite, this positive affirmation, the 
SCA did not find that the doctrine of economic duress was applicable to the facts at hand which 
may suggest that the courts are still reluctant to acknowledge economic duress as an 
actionable claim of duress in our law.  
The court’s reluctance in this regard, has been heavily criticised by academics who disagree 
with the reasoning of the court’s decision. Cassim argues that the court in erred in its 
conception of commercial bargaining in a competitive society. While broadening the scope of 
what constitutes a hard bargain in affluent jurisdictions such as Germany and England might 
be necessary, Cassim argues that it would be unsatisfactory in South Africa.127  
The rationale behind his criticism is based on the fact that in South Africa, there are an ever-
growing number of unsophisticated contractants entering into contracts whose inexperience in 
this realm undoubtedly requires greater protection of the law and a wider formulation of 
duress.128  
Cassim thus argues that if our law developed a modern test of duress, the court would have 
found that Medscheme’s conduct constituted duress. The court in casu adopted the view that 
developing a comprehensive test for economic duress would be futile as these cases are rarely 
brought before a court and are seldomly successful. However, upon a closer analysis of South 
African case law, it appears that the courts have been confronted with issues that would have 
 
123 n 113 above.  
124 n 120 above. 
125 n 120 above.  
126 n 113 above.   
127 n 43 above,  
128 Cassim (n 10) 540.    
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been more effectively dealt with by the doctrine of economic duress, however the courts’  have 
tended to rely on the doctrine of undue influence.129 
3.2.2. Geromlomou Construction (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk: The courts misconception of undue 
influence  
One such case that academics believe would have benefited from the courts’ 
acknowledgement of economic duress is Gerolomou Construction (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk.130 This 
case involved an agreement to modify the terms of an existing contract due to threats of the 
appellant, who was aware of the plaintiff’s financial difficulties.131 In casu, the respondent 
agreed to accept a reduced amount owing to him as the appellant threatened that if he 
disagreed, he would not receive any further payments which would have had disastrous 
consequences for his business.132  
The court found that the plaintiff acted under undue influence due to the disparity in the 
respective bargaining powers, as well as the fact that the appellant was aware of the 
respondent’s dire financial circumstances.133   
However, Pretorius and Ismail argue that the facts at hand fit more comfortably with the notion 
of economic duress and that the court erred in finding that the appellant gained an influence 
over the respondent, as both parties were independent businesses conducting business on a 
level playing field.134 Instead, these academics suggests that the advantage secured by the 
appellant was induced by threats of economic harm, specifically to modify a pre-existing 
contract to the respondent’s detriment.135  
Critics of this judgment have considered the approach adopted in foreign legal systems and 
argued that:136 
 “it is fairly evident that the facts in Gerolomou would most probably satisfy the requirements 
for rescission on the basis of economic duress in English law quite comfortably, In fact, 
arguably, the threat to breach an agreement to secure an unwarranted advantage would 
probably constitute some or other form of unlawful conduct in most Western legal systems.” 
 
 
129 n 90 above.   
130Gerolomou Construction (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 2011 4 SA 500 (GNP).  
131 Gerolomou Construction (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk (n 130) par 5.  
132 n 131 above.  
133 Gerolomou Construction (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk (n 130) par 20. 
134 n 6 above.   
135 Pretorius and Ismail (n 6) 698.  
136 n 42 above.   
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The courts’ reasoning in Gerelomou case depicts the courts’ overreliance on traditional 
contractual defences and unwillingness to develop the common law. In addition, it appears 
that although our courts haven’t fully acknowledged the legitimacy of this defence, this case 
illustrates that developing a principle capable of addressing the commercial realities of 
competitive market is imperative.137 
The utility of developing a comprehensive conception of duress can be evaluated through the 
contemporary approach that has been adopted in Anglo-American legal systems such as 
England and the USA.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 n 90 above.   
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A 
MODERN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DURESS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Economic duress was introduced into the legal arena as a tentative doctrine and has since 
significantly developed during the last decade through a series of decisions in various 
jurisdictions.138 Although the doctrine of duress was considered to be unimportant for many 
years, the twentieth century saw several jurisdictions adopting a new perspective on duress.139 
Both England and the USA are examples of legal systems that developed a functional and 
contemporary test for duress that is capable of addressing all forms of unconscionable 
coercion in a modern commercial world.140  
By analysing the tests developed in these jurisdictions, the need for a modernised approach 
to duress in South African law of contract will become indisputable. The comparative analysis 
will focus mainly on the English doctrine of economic duress, firstly because it was among the 
first countries to recognise economic duress as an actionable claim, and secondly because of 
the English law influence in South Africa. In addition, several American judgments will be 
considered in order to highlight the contemporary Anglo-American perspective on economic 
duress, which could potentially serve as a guideline in the process of developing the South 
African law of contract.  
Whereas South African case law has excluded economic threats from our doctrine of duress, 
both English and American law have acknowledged the inherent illegitimacy of these 
threats.141 Economic duress was recognized, for the first time, in Occidental Worldwide 
Investment Corporation v Skibs A/S Avanti, as a cause of action in English law.142 Economic 
threats were recognised as inducing consensus  through threats and pressure “which the law 
does not regard as legitimate, with the consequence that the consensus is treated in law as 
revocable”.143   
 
138 Phang “Whither economic duress? Reflections on two recent cases” 1990 The Modern Law Review 
107 108.  
139 Glover (n 41) 99.  
140 n 139 above.  
141 n 13 above.   
142 Occidental Worldwide Investment Corporation v Skibs A/S Avanti 1976 1 Lloyds Rep 293.  
143 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v Interntaional Transport Workers’ Federation (The Universe 
Sentinel) 1980 2 Lloyd’s Rep 523 (CA) 7.  
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In an attempt to determine the factors indicative of this novel principle, Anglo-American legal 
systems have developed, what has become known as the two-step enquiry of economic 
duress.144  
4.2.  The two-pronged test for economic duress 
Glover has analysed case law in both the USA and England and formulated a modern test of 
duress, which he believes will be a catalyst for change in South African law and will remove 
the archaic restrictions within our doctrine of duress and ultimately promote fairness in 
contracts.145  
Glover’s modern test is inspired by decisions of courts in the USA and England which have 
accepted and extensively developed a modern doctrine of duress, capable of addressing 
claims of economic duress. His test is formulated as a two-pronged enquiry. The first stage of 
this enquiry evaluates the proposal of the wrongdoer, which focuses on the legitimacy of the 
threat.146 The second stage of this test is the choice enquiry, which determines the motivation 
behind a contract, specifically whether it was induced by threats and the lack of reasonable 
alternatives.147  
4.2.1. The proposal enquiry 
This enquiry is focused on the conduct of the powerful party.148  The nature of threat and the 
demand is analysed to determine whether a party concluded a contract under duress. The first 
stage of this enquiry is to determine whether the conduct of the party was illegitimate, unlawful 
or contra bones mores. This stage is the most contentious issue and English and American 
courts have had diverging views on the parameters of economic duress, specifically in 
distinguishing between ‘lawful act duress’ and ‘unlawful act duress’.149 
4.2.1.1. Lawful act duress v unlawful act duress  
The court in Medscheme agreed with the Anglo-American view that in order for a threat of 
economic harm to constitute economic harm, the nature of the threat must be either “unlawful 
or unconscionable”.150 From this statement, it appears that even where a threat is lawfully 
 
144 n 11 above.   
145 Glover (n 11) 314.  
146 n 57 above.  
147 n 145 above.  
148 Cassim “Economic duress in the law of unjust enrichment in USA, England and South Africa” 1991 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 37 42.   
149 Cassim (n 10) 535.  
150 n 113 above and n 149 above.   
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made, a claim of economic duress will, in appropriate circumstances, succeed where the threat 
is unconscionable.151 Both the American and English courts distinguished between lawful act 
duress and unlawful act duress.152  
The English courts’ approach to distinguishing between lawful and unlawful act duress is based 
on the notion that only illegitimate commercial pressure constitutes economic duress.153 In 
Universe Tankships Incorporated of Monrovia v International Worker’s Federation, the court 
explained that “commercial pressure, in some degree, exists wherever one party to a 
commercial transaction is in a stronger bargaining position than the other party”.154 However, 
Lord Scarman cautioned that: 
 “in life, including life in commerce and finance, many acts are done under pressure, sometimes 
overwhelming pressure; but they are not necessarily done under duress. That depends on 
whether the circumstances are such that the law regards the pressure as legitimate.” 
English courts have emphasised that commercial pressure alone is insufficient to establish 
economic duress, and therefore, only where a person’s will is coerced to the extent that his 
consensus is vitiated will commercial pressure be deemed illegitimate.155 While unlawful acts 
are always considered to be illegitimate, the issue of whether a lawful threat is legitimate is a 
contentious issue. While there has been uncertainty as to whether the English doctrine of 
economic duress extends to cases of lawful act duress, Chitty indicates that a lawful threat to 
cause economic harm amounts to economic duress when it goes beyond what is considered 
normal and legitimate commercial pressure.156  
Moreover, in the USA, the courts have also acknowledged the plausibility of lawful act duress 
and they have provided further guidance on the issue. In Rubenstein v Rubenstein,157 the 
supreme court of New Jersey held that “the act or conduct complained of need not be unlawful 
in the technical sense of the term; it suffices if it is wrongful in the sense that it is so oppressive 
under given circumstances as to constrain one to do what his free will would refuse."  
The American courts consider lawful commercial pressure to be illegitimate when a party is 
responsible for either creating or exploiting the financial vulnerability of another party.158  
 
151 n 149 above.   
152 n 148 above.  
153 n 149 above.  
154 Universe Tankships Incorporated of Monrovia v International Workers’ Federation (n 143) 7.  
155 Occidental Worldwide Investment Corporation v Skibs A/S Avanti (n 142) 89.  
156 Beale H Chitty on Contracts Sweet and Maxwell London (2015) 7-030.  
157 Rubenstein v Rubenstein 120 A.2d 11 N.J (1956).  
158 French v Shoemaker 81 US 314 (1871).  
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Therefore, unless a party was aware of, or responsible for the concerned party’s financial 
distress at the time of contracting, valid consensus was obtained.159 
In cases where a party is responsible for the creation of the prejudiced party’s changed 
circumstances and further exploits their circumstances through economic threats, they 
undoubtedly act illegitimately.160 As these cases are rarely brought before a court, this chapter 
will be focused on cases where a party has knowledge of the other party’s circumstances and 
uses this knowledge to his advantage and induces him into concluding an unfair agreement.  
4.2.1.2. Threats to commit breach of contract and contract modification 
A common example of this scenario is where one party threatens to breach a pre-existing 
contract unless the other party agrees to modify the contract to his detriment.161 Cases 
involving contract modification are in many instances, exemplary of lawful economic duress. 
These cases have become problematic in various legal systems due to the inherent conflicting 
contractual values that underlie this conduct. 
Although legal systems have undoubtedly begun emphasising the importance of fairness in 
contracts, contractual values such as freedom of contract are still considered to be the 
cornerstone of modern law of contract.162 Freedom of contract ensures that parties are “free to 
decide: whether or not to contract; with whom to contract; and on what terms to contract”.163 
This freedom also entitles parties to alter the terms of the agreement at any time.164 The courts 
have historically avoided interfering with private parties’ exercise of these freedoms and have 
therefore, rarely equated contract modification with economic duress.165 
Cases such as these highlight the inherent tensions in the law of contract which include the 
“tension between the absolute nature of contractual obligations and the need to provide relief 
in certain circumstances of hardship”.166  
English law has adopted a restrictive approach to these cases, which is emphasised in CTN 
Cash and Carry v Gallaher,167 where Steyn LJ  held that “it is a mistake for the law to set it 
sights to o highly when the critical inquiry in not whether the conduct is lawful but whether it is 
 
159 French v Shoemaker (n 158) 333. 
160 Glover (n 11) 293.  
161 Glover (n 11) 290. 
162 Dalzell (n 1) 237.   
163 Hutchison et al (n 3) 23.  
164 Glover (n 11) 291.  
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166 Bigwood “Coercion in contract: The theoretical constructs of duress” 1996 46 University of Toronto 
Law Journal 201 242. 
167 CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher 1994 4 ALL ER 714.   
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morally or socially acceptable”.168 He further cautioned that casting the net too wide in this 
regard, would cause significant uncertainty in commerce.169 
The cautionary remarks therefore seem to suggest that a case of lawful economic duress, such 
as threatening breach of contract and contract modification, will be difficult to prove. The 
judgment in Universe Tankships, provides some guidance on this issue and Lord Scarman 
held that the general test for illegitimacy is focused on the nature of what the threat aims to 
induce.170 In other words, in altering the contract, “is the one party attempting to assert 
reasonable or legitimate grievances by making the demands or is that party ‘fighting dirty’ in a 
commercial sense and being opportunistic by exploiting his or her bargaining power?”171  
Therefore, these types of threats will be equated with economic duress where the nature of 
the threat is extortionate or if the threat unfairly exploits the circumstances. If the threats are 
found to be illegitimate in nature, the second step of the enquiry begins, namely the choice 
enquiry.  
4.2.2. The choice enquiry  
In order to establish a successful claim of economic duress, the enquiry must go beyond the 
conduct of the wrongdoer and examine the conduct of the concerned party.172 This enquiry is 
twofold: firstly, the threat must have had an inducive effect on the concerned party and 
secondly, the concerned party’s response must have been reasonable in light of the threats 
made.173  
4.2.2.1. Factual causation  
In determining whether the threat induced a party to enter into a contract or to modify the terms 
of a contract, factual causation is considered.174 Our law places the onus on the claimant to 
prove that had it not been for the duress, he would not have entered into a specific 
agreement.175 However, factual causation becomes problematic to prove in cases of economic 
duress as parties often conclude a contract for multiple reasons and not solely because of 
illegitimate economic threats.176  
 
168 CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher (n 167) 719.  
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Under these circumstances, the English courts have accepted that regardless if the party 
entered into a contract for multiple reasons, if one of these reasons is motivated by an 
illegitimate threat, causation exists.177  
4.2.2.2. Legal causation 
The choice enquiry also requires that conduct of the concerned party was justified, or in other 
words, if he acted reasonably and this is essentially a question of legal causation.178 The 
reasonable alternatives available to the party are integral in determining whether the 
concerned party was justified in succumbing to the threats of the other party. In this regard, 
Mance J stated that even where threats induce a party’s will to a large extent, the concerned 
party “nevertheless had a real choice, and could, if he had wished, equally well have resisted 
the pressure and for example, pursued alternative legal redress”.179 
With regards to the availability of reasonable alternatives, English courts have held that: 180 
“that he entered into it unwillingly (not necessarily under protest, though the absence of protest 
will be highly relevant), that he had no realistic alternative but to submit to the defendant's 
demands, that his apparent consent was exacted from him by improper pressure exerted by or 
on behalf of the defendant, and that he repudiated the transaction as soon as the pressure was 
relaxed." 
The traditional test adopted by American courts have generally accepted that economic threats 
could constitute duress, but only where these threats would “overcome the will of the ordinary 
reasonable man”.181  
However, American courts have begun moving away from this traditional approach and this 
and have emphasised the need for a modern approach as follows:182 
"The same threats may cause fear in one person and not in another. The test of what act or 
threat produces the required degree of fear is not objective. The threat need not be such as 
would put a brave man, or even a man of ordinary firmness, in fear. The question is rather, did 
it put one entering into the transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free 
will and judgment. Age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties, attendant circumstances, must all 
be considered. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature are the very ones that need protection. 
The courageous can usually protect themselves; timid persons are generally the ones 
 
177 Barton v Armstrong 1973 UKPC 27 AC 104 par 121.  
178 Glover (n 11) 308.  
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influenced by threats, and the unscrupulous are not allowed to impose upon them because 
they are so unfortunately constituted."  
The inclusion of this requirement in two-stage enquiry is the cornerstone of a contextual 
approach to duress that has developed over the years.  
4.3. Final remarks on the comparative analysis of economic duress  
Although it might be several years before South African courts officially accept economic 
duress, this comparative analysis of Anglo-American jurisprudence on this issue provides 
a solid foundation that our courts could use as a guideline in formulating a contemporary 
test for duress.183 
While South African law has yet to recognise economic duress as a form of improperly 
obtained consensus, both English and American law differs greatly in this respect and has 
developed a modern test of duress that encompasses all forms of illegitimate threats. The 
major point of comparison with these conflicting legal positions lies in the Anglo-American 
acceptance of a contextual and subjective approach to duress.184  
The judgment in Fox v Piercey, indicates that in determining the illegitimacy of threats, a 
court is required to consider facts such as gender, age and capacity in determining a 
person’s susceptibility to such threats. 185 This will be explored in further detail in the 
following chapter which will discuss a feminist perspective on economic duress and 
determine whether gender is a factor that a South African court should consider in its 
enquiry.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC DURESS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Feminism is a response to patriarchy which aims to analyse the law through the lens of women, 
reflecting on the inherent male interests the law legitimises which has consistently oppressed 
women.186 A feminist perspective on economic duress offers a valuable insight and exposes 
the inherent flaws of the traditional doctrine of duress, which are based in its rigidity and its 
disregard for the context in which contracts are concluded.187 This chapter aims to determine 
whether a modern doctrine of duress that acknowledges threats of economic harm should be 
embraced by South African courts and furthermore, whether a court will be more inclined to 
uphold such an action when it is instituted by a woman.  
While feminism is generally viewed as a separate school of thought, various categories have 
developed over the years and therefore, the issue of economic duress can be discussed from 
various feminist perspectives.188  
This chapter will discuss two sides of the feminist debate in this regard. Firstly, this chapter will 
discuss the narrowness of the law of contract and specifically, the doctrine of duress and how 
it has disregarded women’s experiences in South Africa. From this perspective, the utility and 
importance of developing our law to include economic duress will be evaluated. Secondly, a 
postmodern theory of feminism will be explored with regards to duress and it will discuss 
whether special treatment would ultimately help or hinder women when participating in the 
market economy.189   
5.2. The gendered nature of contract law  
While women have had the right to contract for hundreds of years, this right has brought a new 
set of challenges for women who are often unable to contract as easily as their male 
counterparts. The law is considered to be a product of individual judges and legislators, who 
have interpreted and developed the law according to the social context of their time, race or 
gender.190 For many years, the law was infamously considered to be a ‘males only club’, as 
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the law had become an artefact of male thought which not only ostracised women from the 
legal arena as a whole, but also disregarded the unique experiences of women.191  
As fundamental doctrines of contract law were developed during this oppressive period, 
remnants of inequality and prejudice are ever-present which accurately depicts the patriarchal 
nature of our law.192 Principles such as freedom of contract, consensus as well as contractual 
defences, including duress, are examples of the principles that were developed during this era. 
The abstract and objective nature of these doctrines are considered to be male-gendered traits 
of the law of contract, and feminists view these principles as mechanisms that further entrap 
women in unfavourable economic positions.193 
5.2.1. Women’s economic vulnerability in contract 
In South Africa, women are considered to be the primary caregivers for children and statistics 
indicate that female-headed households are on the rise.194  While women’s rights have reached 
new heights in the fight for gender equality, the expense and stress of motherhood often 
deprive women of their economic freedom and security. The Constitutional court in President 
of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,195 expressed that in South African society, “mothers 
do not only bear a considerably greater portion of the burdens of child rearing than fathers, but 
also that mothers, as a general rule, do have a special role in relation to the nurturing and care 
of children”.196  
O’Regan J went on to explain that this responsibility has become the root cause of women’s 
inequality and disadvantage in South Africa which has prevented women from being  
competitive and successful participants in the economy.197 The remarks made in this judgment 
are in line with poverty patterns that indicate that gender and poverty are inextricably linked 
and that women and female-headed households are generally more economically vulnerable 
than their male counterparts.198  
A recent survey on vulnerable groups in South Africa states that 35.2% of female-headed 
houses support their families solely through social grants and pensions while only 14.6% of 
male-headed households rely on this form of income.199 As of 2012, more than half of female 
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headed households (56.8%) reportedly declared an income of less than R765 per month while 
only 36.3% of males earned below this threshold.200  Moreover, 19% of women aged fourteen 
to eighteen years old, as opposed to 0.4% of men, reported that they were unable to attend 
educational facilities due to their family responsibilities.201  
These statistics highlight the harsh reality women face which indicate that women face more 
economic, familial and educational challenges than their male counterparts which has left the 
majority of South African women unable to achieve economic stability and gender equality. 
Although the essence of modern contract law aims to promote social welfare and economic 
stability, the issue of whether the freedom to contract always promotes women’s social welfare 
and economic stability has become controversial.202  
This issue highlights poignant issues faced by women in our society, where demands of 
autonomy and welfare conflict.203 What is commonly referred to as the dilemma of choice 
depicts freedom of contract as a double-edged sword as, on the one hand, a women’s choice 
to engage in a particular activity promotes her sense of autonomy and enables her to be an 
active participant in the economy.204 However, it is likely that she only elects to contract out 
fear, desperation or necessity, which not only taints her consensus to a certain extent, but also 
has devastating consequences for her. 205  
From the perspective of women, academics argue that what our law perceives to be 
consensus, is in actual fact, women relinquishing their free will due to power and social 
constraints.206 Poverty patterns depict a large majority of South African women as uneducated, 
unemployed, and poverty stricken, and who bear the burden of their children’s survival. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that women who fall into these poverty thresholds 
are undoubtedly more susceptible to threats of economic harm and require the law’s 
protection.  
5.3. A feminist perspective on duress: a contextual approach 
As feminists suggest that a women’s consensus is often ‘unreal’, at first glance, it appears that 
the doctrine of duress would be an ideal mechanism, capable of protecting women who enter 
into unfair contracts. However, as our courts have been reluctant to acknowledge economic 
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threats as a legitimate form of duress, our law of contract offers inadequate protection to 
vulnerable parties. By excluding these threats from the scope of duress to, our law of contract 
legitimises cases of economic coercion, which have devastating effects for women who are 
historically and statistically economically vulnerable in our society.207  
The main point of contention with the traditional doctrine of duress, from a feminist perspective 
is that it fails to consider the context in which consensus is reached and that it relies on abstract 
notions such as the reasonable person test to determine whether a party was justified in 
succumbing to a threat. Feminist scholars argue that the “women’s experiences and values 
serve as an important background to evaluating consensus, which is socially constructed and 
changing”.208  
A contextual approach requires that the alternatives available to the individual be evaluated. 
The context might indicate that a young mother living off social grants, chose between 
accepting to alter a lease agreement or face the possibility that her family would become 
homeless. Alternatively, the context of consensus in respect of certain sex work such as 
pornography and prostitution, might portray that a women was forced to choose between her 
bodily integrity and dignity on the one hand, and her economic survival on the other.209 These 
examples illustrates the importance of adopting a contextual approach to duress that shifts the 
enquiry from the validity of consensus to the availability of acceptable alternatives.210 
American courts have embraced a contextual approach to duress, indicating that:211 
“Age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties, attendant circumstances, must all be considered. 
Persons of a weak or cowardly nature are the very ones that need protection. The courageous 
can usually protect themselves; timid persons are generally the ones influenced by threats, 
and the unscrupulous are not allowed to impose upon them because they are so unfortunately 
constituted” 
This approach would be instrumental in assessing the true nature of a women’s 
consensus. Therefore, if South African courts were to accept the modern approach to 
duress that has been adopted in other legal systems, our law would undoubtedly instil 
confidence in women when contracting and would ultimately offer protection to vulnerable 
contractants who enter into unfair contracts.  
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Radical feminist waves argue that the law should be developed to favour women, and that 
in future a court would generally be more inclined to accept a claim of economic duress if 
it is instituted by a woman. While this approach would offer valuable redress and protection 
to women who are seen as weak contractants, one has to consider whether this type of 
special protection would constitute gender discrimination.  
5.3.1. A feminist perspective on equality 
Early liberal feminist waves were rooted in the attainment of formal equality between men 
and women.212 This feminist perspective disproved of gender disparity in society and 
insisted on the equal treatment of men and women.213 However, critics of this approach 
emphasise that equal treatment and opportunities inadequately address gender inequality 
as women’s inequality is rooted in the innate challenges they are faced with.214 A liberal 
feminist view ignores that “the right to compete on the same terms as men in a male-
dominated world – is of benefit only to a minority of economically and socially privileged 
women, a group of women whose lives approximate the male norm”.215 
As a result of the disillusionment with liberal feminist ideals, a second wave of liberal 
feminism emerged which argues that indirect gender discrimination will ensure the 
“equality of results or outcomes” or substantive equality.216 Substantive equality insists on 
“giving different things to people, so that their differences are responded to in such a way 
that they achieve some kind of equal condition”.217 Feminists suggest that this is the only 
approach that has the potential to address women’s social and material disadvantage in 
society.218   
In South Africa, equality is not only a constitutional right but is considered to the 
cornerstone of our democracy. The Bill of Rights provides that “everyone is equal before 
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”.219 As a result of the 
constitutional recognition of equality, unfair discrimination, in all its forms, is 
unconstitutional.220 However, similarly to feminist views, the South African courts have 
confirmed that our Constitutional dispensation demands a substantive conception of 
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equality that considers the social and economic disparities of historically disadvantaged 
groups.221 
The Constitutional Court emphasised the importance of a substantive conception of equality 
held that the courts are obliged to:222 
“develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises that although a society which 
affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, 
we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before 
that goal is achieved.”  
This judgment appears to confirm that not all instances of discrimination constitute unfair 
discrimination and therefore, it seems that a feminist approach to economic duress would be 
in line with the goals of the Constitution. The judgment in President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Hugo,223 emphasises the rationale behind gender discrimination and illustrates that in 
certain instances, such discrimination is permittable. 
This case saw the Constitutional court uphold a decision that the President’s pardon of 440 
female prisoners who had children under the age of twelve, did not amount to unfair gender 
discrimination.224 This landmark judgment suggests that due to the inherent disadvantage of 
women in our society, gender discrimination in certain instances is not unfair as the law should 
offer special protection to women.225 
Within the realm of the law of contract in particular,  women are not offered equal protection 
and benefit that the Constitution demands.226 Thus,  it appears that our law of contract no 
longer reflects the values of our society, and as such change is inevitable.227 In order to 
promote equality within this realm, the courts have a constitutional obligation to develop the 
common law to give effect to this right.228 It can therefore be suggested that a feminist 
perspective on economic duress is permissible and that if a court were confronted with the 
issue of whether a defence of economic duress could be upheld, the court would be more 
inclined to accept to accept this defence due to women’s vulnerability in society. 
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5.4. The commercial ramifications of a liberal feminist approach 
While formulating a doctrine of duress that offers additional protection to women, would not be 
considered unfair gender discrimination, some feminist scholars argue that doing so would 
have serious commercial ramifications for women.229 Feminists such as Van Marle approve of 
the Constitutional Court’s acknowledgement of substantive equality, however, she criticises 
the reasoning behind the judgment in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo.230  
She argues that the court’s reasoning was rooted in the depiction of women as the primary 
caregivers of children and ultimately confirmed the stereotypical view of women that society 
holds.231 This implies that a conception of substantive equality that is based on patriarchal 
views does little to redress gender disparity in society, and if applied to the law of contract, 
women would likely face devastating commercial ramifications. 
Contractual defences such as the doctrine of duress are considered to be paternalistic 
doctrines that aim to protect weak parties.232 This paternalistic nature of this doctrine was 
confirmed in the United States, where a court criticised a male plaintiff for attempting to rely on 
what the judge described as the “womanish plea of duress”.233 Therefore if a feminist doctrine 
of duress was acknowledged by our courts, feminists argue that this would reaffirm 
stereotypical views that women are weak and in need of the paternalistic protection of our 
law.234 
Furthermore,  developing special rules to assist women in contractual matters might create 
scepticism and uncertainty when contracting with women and would become more costly due 
to the heightened risks of an agreements becoming unenforceable.235 This would undoubtedly 
create a sense of disillusionment amongst powerful parties who would be uninterested in doing 
business with ‘weaker’ parties who could rely on their vulnerability to escape their contractual 
obligations.236 Thus, this approach would hinder women’s prosperity in the market economy in 
the long run and would be unconducive in the fight for true gender equality.  
Therefore, it appears that in future, a court will have to take various policy considerations into 
account when making a determination of whether the law should afford women with extra 
protection when entering into contracts. If a court were to be confronted with this question in 
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future, it is likely that this determination would be decided on a case to case basis. Developing 
the common law to the extent that contracting with women is seen as a burdensome and 
uncertain task, could be detrimental for women transacting in a commercial world.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
For many years, the doctrine of duress has been restrictively interpreted and developed by 
South African courts with the effect that our law is currently incapable of addressing novel 
issues that are commonplace in a commercialised society.  
The South African doctrine of duress extends itself to threats directed at the physical person, 
property or duress of goods, and falls short of recognising threats of economic harm or 
business compulsion. The courts’ disillusionment with economic duress is rooted in the notion 
that these cases are rarely brought before a court and as such, developing the common law in 
this respect would be a futile exercise.  
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Medscheme Holdings v Bhamjee, held that there is 
no principled reason to exclude economic duress from the scope of our law of contract.237 
Although the court’s remarks are undoubtedly a step in the right direction and suggest that a 
court might be inclined to uphold such a claim of economic duress in future, our current test of 
duress is incapable of aiding the courts in this regard.  
Therefore, there are lessons to be learned from Anglo-American legal systems who have 
formulated a two-pronged test for duress that appears to be a more contextual and wider 
conception of duress. If a South African court were prompted to develop a more modern test, 
litigants would be able to rely on a claim of economic duress as a form of improperly obtained 
consensus which would be essential for unsophisticated South African contractants. In 
addition, the contextual approach adopted by American courts in particular, would broaden the 
scope of enquiry and permit a court to consider factors such as age, gender and capacity when 
evaluating the illegitimacy of a threat.  
Gender is one factor in particular, that has brought much attention to this contextual approach 
of duress. Some feminist scholars suggest that due to the gendered nature of contract law and 
the inherent disadvantage of women in our society, a modern conception of economic duress 
could be an ideal mechanism that is capable of protecting vulnerable women who are 
statistically more susceptible to threats of economic harm. By affording women special 
protection, the doctrine of economic duress would become a vessel that promotes the ideal of 
substantive equality within the realm of contract.  
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However, while this approach is undoubtedly in line with our Constitution and the substantive 
conception of equality, a second wave of feminist thought argues that by offering women 
special protection in the law of contract. It would affirm the stereotypical view of women as the 
weaker members of society. In addition, these feminists insist that it would have serious 
commercial ramifications and would ultimately hinder women’s advancement in a competitive 
society.  
In conclusion, the author of this dissertation agrees that our common law of contract should be 
developed to include economic duress as an actionable claim in our law in order to keep 
abreast with international trends, and more importantly to offer additional protection to the ever-
growing number of vulnerable parties entering into the world of commerce.  
However, the author of this dissertation disagrees with a purely liberal feminist conception of 
economic duress which insists on special protection for women and rather, it is submitted that 
a general contextual approach to duress would offer sufficient redress to all vulnerable 
contractants and would not bring about uncertainty and discontent in the commercial realm. In 
conclusion, whether our courts, would, in future, be more inclined to uphold a claim of 
economic duress when it is instituted by a woman, remains to be seen.  
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